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ABSTRACT
In the national and supranational legal area, the need to address the ne 
bis in idem principle is justified by the growing interest aroused by the 
most recent pronouncements of the European Courts. The principle pro-
hibits anyone who has already been acquitted or convicted in a previous 
trial from being tried again. Moreover, it has become a fundamental right 
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The interest in the issue also de-
rives from the need to understand whether the approach of the Italian 
legal system – or any other similar national order – can be considered 
compliant with European tax law and case law, based on the definitions 
of criminal and tax offences. Thus, talking about a European legal space 
means rethinking the idea of punitive power in a dimension that tends to 
be ‘solidarity-based’. The State can consider itself impervious to repres-
sive demands from outside but is instead called to cooperate actively to 
safeguard its own guarantees. The traditional self-referential conception 
of criminal repression effectively summarised in the expression ‘punitive 
sovereignty’ gives way to an idea of jurisdiction that draws directly from 
the principle of mutual recognition. In this scenario, the profile of the 
protection of the individual from the risk of a duplication of the exercise 
of punitive power for the same fact in different states assumes the role 
of the first magnitude. Hence, there is a need to act on two levels at the 
same time: to seek solutions aimed at resolving possible conflicts of juris-
diction (prohibition of competing prosecutions for the same fact), and to 
attribute, within each Member State, preclusive effects to the previously 
judged foreigner (ne bis in idem).
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1 Introduction to the system
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, criminal law has ceased to be a pure state phe-
nomenon. The collapse of the barriers that marked the division into blocks of 
the international community was indeed accompanied by a vast process of 
globalisation of the law, which affected the entire legal system, particularly 
the criminal law.
However, the process of globalization of criminal law has assumed distinctive 
traits, characterised by a marked asymmetry. On one hand, there has been a 
centralisation of criminal law. On the other hand, there is an opposing trend 
to limit this process, under the aegis of human rights.
Both these phenomena tend towards the principles of sovereignty, territo-
riality, and legality, which constitute the traditional triad of modern criminal 
law. Moreover, the crisis of state sovereignty reveals itself in the loss of abso-
luteness of national punitive power: la loi n’a plus tous les droits.
Nowadays, a complex net has replaced the traditional pyramidal structure 
of the sources of law. The national legislative monism ratified in the nine-
teenth-century codes is undermined by different types of normative acts: 
directives, regulations, framework decisions and community sources on one 
hand and international covenantal laws on the other hand.
In this historical, political and cultural context, the principle of ne bis in idem 
ceases to be a purely national phenomenon to become an international issue. 
It constitutes the epiphenomenon of a process that is characterized by the 
presence of two contradictory imperatives.
On one hand, the greater mobility of individuals and the rise of international 
crime, brought by the fall of many frontiers, has led the States to adopt ex-
traterritorial criteria for the application of jurisdiction as well as to widen the 
scope of the criminal penalty.
On the other hand, the interdiction of both pursuits and penalties is justified 
by the need to respect the fundamental rights of individuals in the framework 
of national criminal policies, which are increasingly less impenetrable and con-
ditioned by the demands of the international community.
The Latin phrase ne bis in idem means “not twice for the same thing”. There-
fore, no one can be tried more than once for the same fact. This principle has 
been known since the time of Roman law and it has been applied in all types 
of trials: civil, criminal and administrative ones. Contemporary, this principle 
represents one of the most evident indicators of an advanced stage of legal 
civilization.
The ne bis in idem principle provide that a person cannot be criminally prose-
cuted or punished twice for the same offense. That fundamental right is rec-
ognized both by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(art. 50) and by the European Convention on Human Rights (Protocol No. 7, 
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This contribution finds its roots in very recent judgments of the ECtHR (e.g. 
first 15th November 2016, A and B v. Norway,1 n. 24130/11 and 29758/11, and 
then, 18th May 2017, J. J. v. Iceland2). These sentences raised very important 
debates on the fiscal system and the relationship between the general values 
of the EU law and the national constitutional values.
Indeed, the Grande Chambre established that whether a final sentence has 
been issued against a defendant who has already been fined (with a surtax) 
by the tax administration, the penal trial does not violate the conventional 
principle of ne bis in idem. What is the conditio sine qua non? There must be a 
“sufficiently close connection in substance and time”.
Moreover, in the Icelandic case, the ECtHR confirmed the same principle: it 
restated the necessity of executing the two proceedings (administrative and 
penal) at the same time to avoid a duplication of the investigation activity 
regarding the evidence collection. Thus, the same Court completely changed 
what was declared in this regard up to now, creating further confusion.
Before examining the above-mentioned cases, it may be worth spending a 
little time thinking about what is objectionable about Double Jeopardy in the 
context of tax cases. Article 4 of the Seventh Protocol of the ECtHR prohib-
its a person being “tried or punished again in criminal proceedings” for an 
offense for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted. Thus, it 
covers both situations where an individual is punished twice and where the 
individual is tried twice (or is liable to be tried or punished twice).
In the tax context, it is not unusual for multiple consequences to flow from 
a taxpayer’s failure to comply with tax laws: the individual will be liable to 
pay the additional tax, plus interest, plus administrative penalties (generally 
assessed by the tax authorities, but subject to review or appeal). More than 
one tax might be at issues, such as income tax, social security taxes, and VAT.
In an ideal world, a taxpayer would face a single set of proceedings with a 
cumulative outcome reflecting the severity of the taxpayer’s conduct.
The General Advocate of the Court of Justice also pointed out that the ne bis 
in idem principle is an integral part of the primary law of the Union, and as 
such prevails over the national rules of the Member States.
Therefore, if the rules are incompatible with the universal right of the ne bis 
in idem principle, the national Court or the competent administrative authori-
1 ECtHR, Grande Chambre, 15 November 2016, A e B. v. Norway, App. n. 24130/11 and 29758/11.
2 ECtHR, Sec. I, 18 May 2017, Jòhannesson and others v. Iceland, App. n. 22007/11.
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ties will have to file the pending proceedings, without negative consequences 
for the person who has already been prosecuted or sanctioned in another 
criminal or administrative proceeding.
Finally, on 20th March 2018, the CJEU filed three judgments relating to differ-
ent facts but having the same subject - Cases C-524/15, C-537/16, C-596/16, 
C-597/16 - in which the Court has mostly confirmed the continuity of the du-
plication of proceedings envisaged by Italian law.
Based on those considerations, the statements of the Grande Chambre (re-
garding the Norway case) are likely to be relevant for all those Countries that 
have ratified the Seventh Protocol, in which tax matters can be part of crimi-
nal law and provide substantial administrative fines or surcharges.
3 Key issues and method
Efficiency, in the context of this work, is understood as the capacity of the in-
ternal criminal and administrative procedures to generate decisions containing 
a double penalty. It also seems necessary to follow up the questions below:
1. Compatibility between the Italian double track system and European condi-
tions: a) What interpretation should be given to the ne bis in idem principle 
to ensure its correct application? b) What limits must be recognized (and 
respected) for the coexistence between the (European) ne bis in idem sys-
tem and the (Italian) double-track penalty system? c) Can the Italian legal 
system comply with the requirements of the A and B v. Norway judgment?
2. What is the European action? Eliminate duplication in the same legal situ-
ation and excessive sacrifices, including in terms of the burden of proof. 
Therefore, according to the ECtHR, a considered circulation of data and 
evidence during the tax and criminal procedure phase could only be 
achieved through preventive cooperation between national and suprana-
tional authorities: a) Are National Authorities prepared to cooperate with 
European authorities?
First, it is useful and necessary to briefly describe the principle of ne bis in idem 
to better understand the birth of the double (European) track and the effect 
it has on the Italian system.
Clearly, in the latest years, the relationship between the national and supra-
national judges has become important, given the strong influence on the pro-
duction and interpretation of the domestic law. Specifically, the fiscal matter 
always raised a discussion about the interpretation and application of the 
supranational law regarding the inviolable values of the Italian Constitution.
Indeed, the tax system has been ruled for a long time by the overlapping of 
the criminal and administrative penalty (i.e. double track) which was partially 
modified by article 19 of the legislative decree No. 74/2000.3 The principle of 
3 Legislative Decree no. 74 of 2000 concerns violations of income tax and VAT, with the exclu-
sion of taxes of a different nature.
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specialty, introduced by the Art.19, provides the choice of the special norm 
over the general norm, to avoid the duplication of the procedures and pen-
alties. By doing so, the Italian legislator has overcome the antinomy between 
two different forms.4
Nowadays, after seventeen years, it seems that the double-jeopardy rule has 
never really disappeared, determining an obscure return to the past. Never-
theless, beyond the rise of relevant doubts on its rationality, the double-track 
system is in contrast with the principle of ne bis in idem, declared by both the 
art. 50 EUCFR and art. 4, Prot. n. 7, ECHR.
 In its general structure, this decree has also taken a form typical of the techniques of internation-
al regulatory instruments. In fact, Title I consists of a single article containing the ‘’definitions’’: 
the intent is to provide a synthetic perspective of the main legal concepts whose knowledge, 
on the one hand, represents an inescapable premise for the correct interpretation of the single 
incriminating provisions, on the other hand, allows to quickly detect the boundaries of concepts 
sometimes complex as they relate to substantive tax law.
 The technical-legal instruments, through which the legislator intended to convey preventive 
and punitive responses appropriate to the consistency of the evasive phenomenon, represent 
an indispensable prerequisite of the above-mentioned regulations, contributing to determine 
the crisis of the ‘double-track’ tax sanctions.
 These instruments can be identified in the first instance in Articles 19, 20 and 21 of Decree 
74/2000.
 Thus, the legislator perfected an overall system already outlined by Legislative Decree No. 
472 of 18 December 1997, where a certain ‘qualitative analogy’ between administrative and 
criminal offence is highlighted and where the former is ‘constructed’ and regulated in its gen-
eral connotations in substantially criminal terms (at least about the criteria of imputation and 
techniques of quantification of the sanction).
4 It should be pointed out, first of all, that the principle of speciality, to which Article 15 of 
the Criminal Code refers (with regard to the hypothesis of several criminal laws or several 
provisions of the same criminal law regulating “the same matter”) on the one hand aims at 
implementing the principle of ne bis in idem and, on the other hand, serves to identify and 
regulate an apparent concurrence of incriminating rules which is opposed to the actual or real 
concurrence and the formal concurrence of the same. In fact, there is a uniqueness of crime, 
since the incriminating rule applicable in the specific case is the only one.
 It should be pointed out, first of all, that the principle of speciality, to which Article 15 of 
the Criminal Code refers (with regard to the hypothesis of several criminal laws or several 
provisions of the same criminal law regulating “the same matter”) on the one hand aims at 
implementing the principle of ne bis in idem and, on the other hand, serves to identify and 
regulate an apparent concurrence of incriminating rules which is opposed to the actual or real 
concurrence and the formal concurrence of the same. In fact, there is a uniqueness of crime, 
since the incriminating rule applicable in the specific case is the only one.
 In the second place, it is worth remembering that the same Article 19 is followed by Articles 
20 and 21, which, together with the first, contribute to delineate the overall system in which 
the specialty criterion operates, with the specification of the concrete operative modalities of 
the same.
 Article 20, in fact, provides that the administrative assessment procedure and the tax trial 
cannot be suspended due to the pending criminal proceedings concerning the same facts or 
facts on whose assessment the relative definition depends. In the same way, and pursuant to 
Articles 3 and 479 of the Criminal Code, the criminal trial cannot be suspended pending the 
definition of the tax trial, given the probative limits relative to this second trial.
 Thus, the double-track system is composed of two main corollaries: on the one hand, the tax 
judgement has no effectiveness in the criminal trial, unlike what happened before the Legisla-
tive Decree No. 429 of 1982, when the rule of the ‘tax preliminary ruling’ was in force; on the 
other hand, and correlatively, not even the criminal judgement has effectiveness in the tax 
trial, even if the extra-penal ineffectiveness of the first seems to derive from Article 654 of the 
Criminal Code, in relation to the probative limitations to which the second trial is submitted.
 With regard to Art. 21, the Legislator has evidently intended to make a balance between the 
application of the principle of specialty and the principle of the double track - as transposed 
by the previous Articles 19 and 20 - and the need not to determine an excessive expansion of 
the time of carrying out, in concrete terms, the administrative activity of ascertaining the tax 
evaded and of imposing the connected non-criminal sanctions.
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Also, except in rare cases, the Court of Cassation does not agree with the 
ECtHR vision. Indeed, the Judges do not reveal a contrast among the prin-
ciples cited above but do confirm the possible existence of a penal/admin-
istrative double track. In fact, with the legislative decree N. 158 of 2015, the 
Italian legislator did not feel the need – neither the duty – to offer a solution 
to the evident violation of the principle of ne bis in idem, as suggested by the 
ECtHR. On the other hand, the ECtHR has often declared the conventional 
illegitimacy of the penal/administrative double track, even if related to the 
punitive tax-related system of other States (as in the art. 4, Prot. n. 7, ECHR).
In this context, it appears relevant to mention the most important ECtHR 
case-law in the field of ne bis in idem, i.e. 8th June 1976 – Engel vs. the Neth-
erlands, 10th February 2009 – Zolotukhin vs. Russia, 4th March 2014 – famous 
case of Grande Stevens vs. Italy, 27th November 2014 – Lucki Dev vs. Swe-
den, and 10th February 2015 – Kiiveri vs. Finland; CGUE: Akerberg Fransson vs. 
Sweden): these judgments are the basic guidelines for the ongoing debates.
4 Results
4.1 European and Italian point of view. Similarities and 
differences
The analysis of these European case-law has been relevant in this context be-
cause they entailed certain reflections on the Italian penalty system. Indeed, 
the remarkable jurisprudential and doctrinal debate on the ne bis in idem prin-
ciple has finally reached the Constitutional Court, thanks to the Court of Mon-
za.
The case concerned the owner of an individual company who was sanctioned 
in a final judgment first with an administrative penalty and then he was pros-
ecuted in a criminal proceeding (for the same year and the same taxes) for 
the crime of omitted revenue declaration pursuant ex-art. 5 of the legislative 
decree No. 74 of 2000.
The judge of Monza, after having recalled the jurisprudence of the suprana-
tional Courts about matters regarding the ne bis in idem violation, turns to the 
Constitutional Court and he points out that the administrative penalties that 
were given in this case:
– They were criminal penalties;
– The historical fact at the base of the two proceedings was the same;
– On one hand, the Italian system provides a remedy to the double-track 
judicial system;
– On the other hand, the ne bis in idem principle, as required from the inter-
national jurisprudence, is not always guaranteed.
While the ECtHR had sometimes deemed compliant to art. 4, Prot. 7, ECHR, 
the Constitutional Court declares that the criterion of “sufficiently close con-
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nection in substance and time” could not be viewed as a general principle 
since it had only been applied in specific cases. Thus, it recognizes the imper-
ative nature of the conventional ne bis in idem and that its effects cannot be 
mediated by personal considerations of the national judges.5
Indeed, according to the constitutional judges, these criteria could be applied 
to the relationship between tax and criminal proceedings only if (as it is the 
case in Italian law) both the administrative and criminal judges are required 
to independently assess the facts. Therefore, the substantial and temporal 
relationship between the two proceedings would not be enough condition 
for the European case law, to effectively exclude the ne bis in idem principle.
However, with the Norway case, the Court of Strasbourg has embarked on a 
new development of the subject, trying to meet the interpretative difficulties 
created as a result of the strict interpretation of Art. 4, Prot. 7.
The Constitutional Court provides that the ECtHR (with the Norway case) rec-
ognizes that the principle of ne bis in idem principle ceases to act as an imper-
ative rule, but its application is subordinated to the assessment by the judge 
about the existence of a “sufficiently close connection in substance and time” 
of the two proceedings.
In other words, it can be stated that we have moved from the prohibition 
imposed on the States to start two independent proceedings for the same 
unlawful act, to the faculty of coordinating, in time and substance, these pro-
cedures, so that they can be considered as a unique and adequate punitive 
answer.
In conclusion, the Court states that the new meaning of the law, introduced 
by the Norway case, involves the return of documents to the National Court 
to be assessed on the issue of constitutional legitimacy. In fact, if the nation-
al court considers that the criminal proceedings are connected, in substance 
and time, to the tax proceedings (so as not to constitute a conventional ne bis 
in idem) there would be no need to introduce any rule, which imposes not to 
proceed for the same fact.
5 Discussion and conclusion: what are the most appropriate 
solutions today?
For some years now, especially since the well-known Grande Stevens judg-
ment of the ECtHR, the question of the possible violation of the principle of 
ne bis in idem, as conceived by national case law, has been raised in doctrine 
and jurisprudence based on the already mentioned rules contained in Art. 4, 
Prot. 7, ECHR and Art. 50 EUCFR. The problem relates to the compatibility of 
the dual-track system of sanctions with the transnational regulatory system 
as interpreted by the case-law of the EDU and the European Court of Justice. 
And - at least in the abstract - it affects, transversally, all tax crimes that punish 
5 Italian Constitutional Court, 5 December 2018, sentence N. 48. 
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conduct substantially superimposable on those punished also at the adminis-
trative level.
The issue is of extreme importance, as demonstrated by the fact that - follow-
ing numerous rulings by the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts (relating, in 
large part, to the subject of tax offenses) - it is precisely the Italian judges who 
have in recent years raised multiple preliminary questions (of interpretation 
before the European Court of Justice, and constitutional legitimacy).
The contrast derives in particular - and in a nutshell - from a series of prin-
ciples, by now more than consolidated in transnational jurisprudence (but 
not yet fully transposed by Italian jurisprudence), through which the ECtHR 
and the European Court of Justice have reconstructed - in a binding way for 
national judges - the content of the ne bis in idem; content that, with all ev-
idence, is decidedly wider than the restricted scope of criminal proceedings 
and, in particular for the Italian system, than the perimeter outlined by Article 
649 of the Italian Criminal Code.
As repeatedly highlighted in the body of the contribution, the recent ruling 
of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR (judgment of November 15, 2016) re-
garding the Norwegian tax penalty system has had a far from marginal - and 
in a restrictive sense - impact on the boundaries of ne bis in idem, significantly 
weakening the problem of compatibility between double track sanctions and 
prohibition of bis in idem.
Thus, this principle, originally confined within the narrow limits of a nation-
al-territorial dimension, has today become a fundamental right of the Europe-
an citizen, deploying its effects in the territory of all the member states of the 
European Union. To the already mentioned prohibition of double proceed-
ings for the same fact before the judicial authorities of the same State (so-
called internal dimension) corresponds the prohibition of double proceedings 
for the same fact before the judicial authorities of different States (so-called 
transnational dimension), a sphere which is expressly contemplated in supra-
national sources.
The ECtHR and the European system, centred on the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Human Rights, seem to move in the same direction, although with the 
inevitable differences imposed by the different legal contexts in which the 
two Courts are located. Both impose a reflection on the domestic system fo-
cussed on the double track and on the principle of specialty, a system which - 
as interpreted by the Court of Cassation and, last but not least, as seen by the 
Constitutional Court itself - seems not entirely consistent with supranational 
approaches.
Rebus sic stantibus, from the analysis carried out so far, the situation of im-
mobility appears rather evident.
On the one side, a jurisprudence too cautious and shrewd to affirm the supe-
riority of the right to ne bis in idem on the internal sanctioning mechanisms; 
on the other side, an unarmed legislator, or rather, absent, who continues to 
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renounce to furnish answers and concrete solutions to the multiple problems 
of compatibility between the internal regulations and the aforementioned 
fundamental right6 (Scaroina, 2015, pp. 2920–2921).
Also, the pronouncements of the internal Courts have not failed to underline 
the necessity of a legislative intervention on the subject, which would finally 
bring to a conclusion the much desired and spurred - and, at this point of the 
path, one could say almost utopian - overall reorganization of the relations 
between administrative and criminal offenses.
The Constitutional Court has chosen itself not to intervene through a strong 
solution (as could have been the declaration of constitutional illegitimacy of 
the double-track sanctions, as happened in France), thus turning off the last 
lights of hope turned on in doctrine (Fatta, 2017, p. 23).7
The legislator should undoubtedly have made a greater commitment to really 
protect, and not only through proclamations, the fundamental right to ne bis 
in idem.
At the same time, it cannot fail to take into account a necessary reflection, re-
garding problems which have repeatedly emerged of compatibility between 
the obligation to comply with the ECtHR and the legal tradition on which the 
national criminal law (first, and then the tax law) is based (Scaroina, 2015, 
p. 2922).8 While waiting for the legislator to take action, the national judg-
es could have derogated from one of the founding values of our democratic 
system (through recourse, for example, to an extensive interpretation of Art. 
649 of the Criminal Code) in the perspective of the maximum guarantee of 
fundamental rights.
Among the thousands of doubts and uncertainties that still permeate the 
ground of the double track and its relations with the prohibition of bis in 
idem, all that remains is to identify the only solutions that seem to exist, in a 
hypothetical and (perhaps too much) optimistic perspective.
To achieve this possible ‘way forward’, it is considered necessary to briefly go 
over the different approaches put in place by the Constitutional Court, since 
they allow us to understand how the supranational norm affects the national 
one.
6 In which it considers that “the hermeneutic chaos that transpires from the decisions of na-
tional courts is first and foremost the child of the guilty absconding of the legislator, increas-
ingly concerned to respond, invariably with the sole instrument of criminal sanction, to the 
changing and contingent security demands of the citizens, coagulating and at the same time 
interpreting the social consensus in an instrumental way and directing it towards more and 
more well-defined types of enemies”.
7 Which had indeed hoped that the Consulta would take the opportunity (relating to the ques-
tion raised by the Court of Monza) to intervene decisively as had been done by the Conseil 
Constitutionnel in France. The latter declared, in fact, the constitutional illegitimacy of the 
double track, “qualifying as disproportionate the combination of administrative and criminal 
penalties for the Declaration of Human and Individual Rights of 1789, which requires the leg-
islature to provide only for penalties that were strictly and necessary”.
8 Widely on the point Scaroina which highlights just how the principle of legality (present in the 
ECtHR as ‘inviolable core right’) is understood by the Strasbourg Court “in its more limited 
meaning of knowability and, above all, predictability of decisions, being instead (...) the reser-
vation of law extraneous to the conventional legal tradition and the granitic coverage of art. 7”.
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First, to draw conclusions (and therefore to establish starting points) on the 
national tax system and the related problems discussed so far, it can be ar-
gued that:
– the formally administrative but essentially criminal sanction cannot be cu-
mulated with the criminal sanction imposed for the crime envisaged con-
cerning the same concrete fact;
– the relationship between the proceedings relating to the application of 
the first and the proceedings relating to the application of the second is 
regulated by their time scale, i.e. the rule of prevalence of the proceedings 
that end first in a sort of race against time applies: once one of the two 
proceedings has been defined, the other may not be initiated, and if it is 
pending it must in any case stop, without ever ending, let alone lead to the 
imposition on the same person of a second sanction that can be cumulat-
ed with the one already paid;
– the result is that the system outlined in Articles 19, 20 and 21 of Legisla-
tive Decree 74/2000, which focuses on the application of the principle of 
specialty, the double-track rule and the mechanism of linking the acts of 
definition of the proceedings that take place in administrative and criminal 
proceedings, is certain and manifestly incompatible with the Community 
regulations.
Now, the Constitutional Court has initially extended the scope of the rule - as 
provided for in the literal data - to make it applicable not only to the case of 
a sentence or criminal decree of conviction that has become definitive, but 
also to that in which a new criminal trial is brought against the person against 
whom another proceeding is simply pending. This shows that there are no 
reasons in principle to oppose an extensive reading of the code of conduct.
On the other hand, the Judge of Laws has provided some indications relevant 
to this reasoning, although in the context of a ruling of inadmissibility of the 
constitutionality questions raised by various referring judges. Inter alia, the 
Constitutional Court – called to intervene such as to declare the constitution-
al illegitimacy of Article 649 of the Criminal Code (“in so far as it does not 
provide for the applicability of the prohibition of a second trial to the case 
in which the defendant has been tried, by irrevocable measure, for the same 
fact, in an administrative procedure for the application of a sanction which 
must be recognized as criminal by the Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols”) – did not show a 
discouraging upstream attitude about this possibility. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that it has incidentally highlighted the existence of a ‘structural viola-
tion’ by the Italian legal system of the prohibition of ne bis in idem, at least in 
the area of sanctions relating to the financial market, already the subject of 
the Grande Stevens ruling.
At the same time, the Court was also unable to rule on several questions, 
based on the finding that the application was inadmissible, given the uncer-
tainties expressed by the referring court itself.
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In particular, in the judgment at issue, the referring Court maintains that “the 
acceptance of such a question would give rise to uncertainty as to the type of 
response to penalties - administrative or criminal - which the system relates 
to the occurrence of certain types of conduct, based on the random circum-
stance of the procedure defined more quickly”.
It is therefore clear that the perplexities expressed therein do not seem in-
surmountable, so much so that it is reasonable to assume that, faced with 
a better formulated question, the Constitutional Court could in the future 
pronounce on the constitutional legitimacy of the Art. 649 of the Penal Code, 
as read in the European guidelines.
In fact, based on the above-mentioned statement, this situation9 is precisely 
the one outlined by the sentence in a comment. Therefore, should this situ-
ation occur, far from raising doubts, it would be entirely consistent with the 
guidelines expressed by conventional jurisprudence. On the other hand, the 
possible violations of other constitutional regulations, to which the same or-
der of remittance refers, do not seem to be acceptable, precisely in consider-
ation of the essentially criminal nature of the tax sanctions.
Therefore, from the writer’s point of view and in contrast with many opinions, 
the suitable solution to overcome the contraindications proposed in the tax 
sector can be found in the possibility of supporting the interpretative adap-
tation of the system based on Art. 649 c.p.p. to the guidelines manifested by 
the ECtHR, in such a way as to render our system conform to them without 
the need for positive interventions by the Legislator.
In this sense, although it is true that the Court of Cassation, in a similar case, 
considered the question of the constitutional legitimacy of Article 649, Code 
of Criminal Procedure (which had been requested based on the ne bis in idem 
provided for by the ECtHR) as unfounded, it is also true that this groundless-
ness was raised only for the acknowledged non-criminal nature of the sanc-
tion provided for by Article 649. The article 116, para. 8, letter a), Law no. 388 
of 23 December 2000,10 such as to exclude a conspiracy with the crime of 
failure to pay the social security withholding tax referred to in Article 2 of Law 
no. 638/1983. From such a perspective, it would be evident the reinforcement 
of the thesis that, by now, the conventional norm, as univocally interpreted by 
the ECtHR, constitutes the only reference parameter in the matter of ne bis in 
idem, to which the code forecast is obliged to adapt.
Again, in a more recent speech on the same issue, the Constitutional Court 
- although it has once again called on the legislature to regulate the issue 
directly to “remedy the frictions that the so-called double-track system gener-
ates between the national system and the ECtHR” - has enhanced the criteria 
9 I.e. the situation in which the judge of the trial that starts second is obliged to stop in order 
not to violate the ne bis in idem
10 This provides that ‘persons who fail to pay the contributions or premiums due to social se-
curity and welfare management within the prescribed period [...] shall [...] pay a civil penalty, 
yearly, equal to the official reference rate plus 5,5 points’.
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developed by the A and B v. Norway judgment without, however, solving the 
sense just argued.
The Court reiterates that Article 649 of the Criminal Code “applies only to 
criminal matters in the proper sense” and maintains that “in the absence of 
a declaration of constitutional illegitimacy, the forecast code is not able to 
regulate the case in question”. So, what consequences could this have? From 
writer’s point of view, the reference to the criteria elaborated in A and B case 
would be valid, but only to the extent that they allow the combination of 
the two criminal and administrative sanctions. In the opposite hypothesis, i.e. 
where such a cumulation is contrary to the principle of ne bis in idem as elab-
orated by the ECtHR, then the reconstruction of the scope of the principle by 
the latter would not be able to comply with the internal provision and would, 
therefore, cease to be effective internally until the legislator or the Constitu-
tional Court itself intervenes, alternatively, with a declaration of constitution-
al illegitimacy of the code.
Secondly - looking at the repercussions (and trying to imagine the ones that 
will still exist) that, on such proceedings, the judgment of the ECtHR has 
brought - in the opinion of the writer, it seems necessary to point out that all 
the reasoning developed by the Grand Chamber, in support of the assertion 
that in the present case there is no violation of Art. 4, Prot. 7, moves from the 
preliminary consideration that the principle of ne bis in idem does not exclude, 
a priori (and subject to compliance with certain conditions), that individual 
States adopt regulatory systems characterized by a double track of sanctions 
(administrative and criminal).
As is sufficiently clear from the judgment in question, however, this regulato-
ry option can be compatible with the ne bis in idem principle only and exclu-
sively when there is - first and foremost - a prerequisite: in the system taken 
into consideration, the two sanctions (criminal and administrative) must pur-
sue different and complementary purposes and - in particular - the criminal 
sanction must be provided, alongside the administrative one, for the punish-
ment of acts of tax evasion that do not end with the mere non-payment of the 
tax but are instead connoted by an additional component and, specifically, by 
fraudulent conduct.
In other words, the first requirement that the ECtHR requires in order to ex-
clude a breach of Art. 4, Prot. 7, ECHR is that, as in the case of the two Norwe-
gian citizens, the celebration of a dual procedure for the same fact is derived 
from the need to prosecute the taxpayer, also in criminal (and not only admin-
istrative) proceedings, concerning the fraudulent conduct that the taxpayer 
has committed, which is an additional element to the non-payment of the tax.
It seems, in short, untenable an interpretation which, while admitting the lack 
of difference between a formally criminal sanction and a sanction (otherwise 
called) - which, however, has the substance of the latter - and while recognizing 
the pervasiveness of the supranational jurisprudence which has founded such 
an assimilation, stops in the face of the literal tenor of the internal disposition 
and from this, gives rise to the need for intervention by the legislator or a 
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demolition ruling by the Constitutional Court. If the ECtHR itself has conclude 
that the ‘living law’ referred to above has shaped the letter of Art. 4, Prot. 7, 
ECHR, an identical effect must also be possible about the internal provision.
On closer inspection, moreover, in other contexts our Supreme Court has not 
hesitated to admit such an interpretation, arguing that the domestic court 
must interpret the domestic norm following the ECtHR ‘as it lives in the case-
law of the European Court’.
On the other hand, different reasoning would lead to giving the individual 
states party to the EDU Convention considerable discretion in grading the 
applicative effects of the conventional rules shaped by supranational juris-
prudence. Such a possibility would, of course, be incompatible with the objec-
tives of the Convention itself and, on the contrary, would run counter to the 
uniform function attributed to the latter.
It would justify, in other words, a ‘leopard’s eye’ application of the principles 
developed by the ECtHR, now admitting their influence on the interpretation 
of the domestic provision (as concerning the rules of due process under Arti-
cle 6, ECHR), now denying it as in the present case.
While being aware, to date, of the rejection by the Italian Constitutional Court 
and the Italian Supreme Court itself, from the writer’s point of view the solu-
tion just proposed would have the merit of guaranteeing the conformity of 
our system to conventional obligations in an automatic way, without media-
tion by internal bodies, with the related expansion of time.
In this sense, such an approach would also be consistent with the requests 
coming from the neighbouring area of European Union law - in which it has 
been argued that the prohibition of ne bis in idem enshrined in Article 50 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - is also valid con-
cerning the sanctions formally called tax sanctions but which are endowed in 
substance with such a function as to assimilate them to criminal ones.
There is no doubt that even in the European context, as has been pointed out 
repeatedly in this contribution, there is no lack of ambiguity. In fact, contra-
dicting the Advocate General’s requests in the Menci case the European Court 
of Justice has recently admitted the cumulation of criminal and administra-
tive sanctions for failure to pay withholding taxes (Article 10-bis of Legislative 
Decree 74/2000 and Article 13 of Legislative Decree 471/1997), limiting itself 
to stating that it is legitimate to the extent that there is “coordination aimed 
at reducing to what is strictly necessary the additional burden that such cumu-
lation entails for the parties concerned”.
Such a move is in the wake of the prudential approach - which is also reflect-
ed in the A and B judgment, which after the very clear positions taken in the 
first judgments - softens the absoluteness of the ne bis in idem principle since 
it is more likely to come under political pressure from the Member States. 
Compared to the context outlined by the ECtHR, the position of the Court 
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of Justice is less clear, justifying the view of those who see a disconnection 
between the case-law of the former and the latter.
However, the Menci judgment, in admitting the cumulation of penalties which 
it considers to be consistent with the Union’s objective of effectively combat-
ing VAT evasion and fraud, seems to suggest an approach not unlike that of 
the A and B v. Norway judgment, the results of which are expressly referred 
to by the Luxembourg courts. It is stated that, in the meantime, an accumu-
lation of sanctions conforms with Article 50 EUCFR, where not only does the 
overall severity of the sanction not exceed a limit of severity commensurate 
with the seriousness of the offense, but also where there is effective coordi-
nation between the two proceedings, in terms of both the functions pursued 
and the procedural burden.
Again, as pointed out above, the discrepancy between the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR and the European Court of Justice has been particularly evident 
in terms of the principle of homogeneity. The approach of the Court of Lux-
embourg to the Art. 52(3) is useful to highlight that, in the Åkerberg case, 
the Court kept silent on the case-law of the ECtHR and, implicitly, invoked 
the application of Engel’s criteria, and then placed the matter in the hands 
of the national court to determine the criminal nature (or otherwise) of the 
surcharge. On closer inspection, it never specified that these criteria were de-
veloped in the case-law of the Court of Luxembourg itself, but it directly men-
tioned the Bonda case, which expressly refers to the case-law of the Court of 
Strasbourg and the Engel criteria. The case was received by the Court in 2010, 
which means that, following the entry into force of the Charter and because 
of Poland’s opt-out protocol, the Charter was not invoked.
The fact that the European Court of Justice did not mention the case-law of 
the ECtHR in the Åkerberg case gave rise to different views on its actual inten-
tions. On the one hand, it was argued that the Court wanted to give a specific 
- more limited - meaning to the homogeneity clause in Article 52(3) of the 
Charter, thus avoiding mentioning the Convention. On the other hand, it was 
also argued that the Åkerberg case “skilfully and indirectly aligns the criteria 
of the European Court of Human Rights for determining a criminal charge 
with those of the Charter” and that “the Charter has reinforced the impact of 
the ECtHR”. The latter opinion seems to be more appropriate and in line with 
the judgment since, while only citing the Bonda case, the Strasbourg Court 
indirectly referred to the ECtHR in the Engel case.
It would seem, therefore, that from the conclusions of the Åkerberg case the 
alignment of the European Court of Justice with the view of the ECtHR is in-
ferred, which would lead one to think that the European Court of Justice has 
never directly addressed the issue of Art. 52(3) in the Åkerberg case, but has 
indirectly used the Engel criteria.
The assertion made by some professors (Groussot–Ericsson, 2016, p. 73; Lock, 
2009, pp. 383-384) that the Court in Luxembourg decided to adopt a ‘mini-
malist interpretation’ of Art. 52(3) in the Åkerberg case seems correct.
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This means that to maintain a certain distance from the ECtHR, the CJEU did 
not explicitly address its case law or any other issue related to the Convention 
but preferred to adopt the Engel criteria silently, making sure, more than any-
thing else, that the focus was entirely on the Charter and issues concerning 
the legal order of the European Union and not on possible disconnections 
between the Courts since the ultimate aim is and must always be the correct 
application of the rule.
All that has been stated so far, highlights, even more, that the acceptance of 
the solution proposed therein would be the easiest - and at the same timeless 
traumatic - way to avoid the protection gap that, rebus sic stantibus, our sanc-
tioning system creates against a taxpayer who is the author of a tax illegal 
conduct. It would take the issue away from the inevitable long timescale of 
the legislator’s action (which has been required for years) and, at the same 
time, would not require a demolition intervention by the Constitutional Court.
Ultimately, it is a matter of taking note of the fact that supranational bodies 
have determined - in this as in many other areas - a profound modification 
of concepts and institutions proper to national systems, so much to make it 
more than necessary to re-read the internal rules based on the (now increas-
ingly urgent) requirements that living law, not only national but also suprana-
tional, suggests.
Perhaps, even, in this case, a more intense and fruitful dialogue between our 
Supreme Courts and supranational jurisdictions - which has already proved 
effective regarding the well-known Taricco case - would make it possible to 
prevent misunderstandings and would open the way to forms of interpreta-
tion of internal norms in a systematic key about the complex of supranational 
principles and values that now permeate, and in some way dutifully define the 
national order.
As argued since the beginning of this contribution, “rien n’est une excuse pour 
agir contre ses principes”.11 There are superior rules whose respect is essential 
to safeguard the interests of all. Rules which, if violated, would undermine 
even more the current social landscape, since their violation would necessar-
ily bring harmful consequences for citizens. Rules without which the founda-
tions of today’s society would fail.
The ne bis in idem principle is an undoubtedly part of these rules and that is 
why, at this moment in history more than ever, a firm point must be made.
11 Mention of Madame de Staël (Anne-Louise Germaine Necker), Considération sur la Révolution 
française (posthume, 1818).
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